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LOSING THE SPIRIT OF TINKER V. DES MOINES AND THE 
URGENT NEED TO PROTECT STUDENT SPEECH 
By David L. Hudson, Jr.1 
Nearly fifty (50) years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court declared in Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District that public school students did 
not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”2 It remains the seminal case on K-12 student speech rights in 
the United States of America3 and the “high water mark” of student rights.4 One 
of the litigants in the Tinker case, the late Christopher Eckhardt5, stated: “What 
George (Washington) and the boys did for white males in 1776, what Abraham 
Lincoln did to a certain extent during the time of the Civil War for African-
American males, what the women's suffrage movement in the 1920s did for 
women, the Tinker case did for children in America."6 
The Tinker case led to a new era for student speech, increased litigation over 
school dress codes and hairstyles and created a fundamental appreciation that 
young persons were truly persons under the Constitution who had constitutional 
rights that needed to be respected.7   
Sadly, that day has passed and gone. Today courts increasingly restrict student 
discourse even under the speech-protective standard that Justice Abe Fortas 
pronounced for the Supreme Court in Tinker. Students live in an environment that 
does not respect their constitutional rights. Sadly, this is creating a generation of 
                                                          
1 David L. Hudson, Jr. is a Robert H. Jackson Fellow for the Foundation for Individual Rights in 
Education (FIRE) and the First Amendment Ombudsman for the Newseum Institute First 
Amendment Center.  He teaches classes at Vanderbilt Law School and the Nashville School of 
Law.   He would like to thank Azhar Majeed for reading earlier versions of this essay.  
 
2 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).  
 
3 David L. Hudson, Jr. Black Armbands, Boobie Bracelets, and the Need to Protect Student 
Speech, 81 UMKC L. REV. 595, 596 (2013). 
   
4 Broussard v. Sch. Bd. of Norfolk, 801 F.Supp. 1526, 1534 (E.D. Va. 1992).  
  
5 David L. Hudson, Jr., Christopher Eckhardt Left His Mark As Student Speech Litigant, 
NEWSEUM INST., (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.newseuminstitute.org/2013/01/03/christopher-
eckhardt-left-his-mark-as-student-speech-litigant/. 
 
6 David L. Hudson Jr., On 30-Year Anniversary, Tinker Participants Look Back at Landmark 
Case, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, (Feb. 24, 1999), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/on-30-
year-anniversary-tinker-participants-look-back-at-landmark-case/. 
 
7 DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., LET THE STUDENTS SPEAK!: A HISTORY OF THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS, 69 – 84 (2011); Stuart L. Leviton, Is Anyone Listening to 
Our Students? A Plea for Respect and Inclusion, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35, 41 (1993).   
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younger persons who don’t have the same level of appreciation for the supreme 
importance of freedom of speech.  
This essay first examines the Tinker case and reminds readers of the powerful 
language Justice Fortas used in his majority opinion. It explains that the test from 
Tinker was designed to be a speech-protective standard for student litigants. The 
second part of the essay evaluates several recent cases, which demonstrate that the 
once speech-protective standard in Tinker has become a test that is often favorable 
and deferential to school officials embroiled in student, free-speech controversies.   
      I. The Glory of Tinker and the Protection of Free Speech  
The Tinker case arose in a time of great social activism. Many people exercised 
their First Amendment rights to protest both the civil rights movement and the 
Vietnam War. The Tinker family was no different. The patriarch of the family, 
Leonard Tinker, had been removed from his church because of his stance against 
racial discrimination.  He also had worked for the pacifist organization, American 
Friends Service Committee.8 Margaret Eckhardt, the mother of litigant 
Christopher, was the president of the Des Moines chapter of the Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom.9 
The Tinker and Eckhardt families’ passion for social justice passed down to their 
kids. Siblings John and Mary Beth Tinker, Christopher Eckhardt, and several 
other students wore black armbands to their public schools to protest U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam, to support Robert Kennedy’s Christmas truce, and to 
mourn those who had died in the conflict.   
School officials learned of the impending armband protest and quickly passed a 
resolution prohibiting the wearing of such armbands. Interestingly, school 
officials allowed students to wear other forms of symbolic speech, such as iron 
crosses or political campaign buttons. Thus, the Tinker case was an early pristine 
example of viewpoint discrimination – the public school targeting a specific 
symbol associated with a specific political viewpoint.  
The students wore their armbands in spite of the school rule and faced 
suspensions from their principals. Ultimately, they sought vindication in the 
courts. A federal district court judge ruled against them, ruling that school 
officials “have an obligation to prevent anything which might be disruptive” of 
the school atmosphere.10 He reiterated that “[u]nless the actions of school officials 
… are unreasonable, the Courts should not interfere.”11   
                                                          
8 See Hudson, Let The Students Speak!, at 58-59.  
 
9 Hudson, Let the Students Speak, at 59.  
  
10 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 258 F.Supp. 971, 972 (S.D. Iowa 1966).  
  
11 Tinker, 258 F.Supp. at 972.   
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The students appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit but 
could do no better than a 4-4 split from the en banc court who issued only a one-
paragraph opinion indicating the vote.12  That meant their only avenue of relief 
could come from the Court of Last Resort – the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court 
ruled 7-2 in favor of the students, proclaiming that students “do not shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate.”13  In his majority opinion, Justice Fortas acknowledged that student speech 
rights must be interpreted “in light of the special characteristics of the school 
environment.”14 
Fortas also noted that the students’ actions of wearing the black armbands was 
“akin to pure speech”15 and that “the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of 
this case was entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by 
those participating in it.”16 Later, they emphasized the lack of disruptions caused 
by the armband-wearing students, writing: “The school officials banned and 
sought to punish petitioners for a silent, passive expression of opinion, 
unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on the part of petitioners.”17 He 
added that there was “no evidence whatsoever” that the protesting students 
interfered with the work of the school or intruded on the rights of other students.18 
Fortas created what later became known as the Tinker standard or substantial 
disruption test.  He wrote that there was no “reason to anticipate that the wearing 
of the armbands would substantially interfere with the work of the school or 
impinge upon the rights of other students.”19 He later reiterated that student 
speech should be protected unless the speech "materially and substantially 
interfer[es] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school" and [does not] collid[e] with the rights of others.”20 
The test has two parts – the substantial disruption part and the element of the 
invasion or impingement of the rights of other students. Most of the litigation 
post-Tinker has centered on what constitutes a substantial disruption or reasonable 
                                                          
12 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967).  
  
13 Tinker, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).   
 
14 Id.  
 
15 Id. at 508.  
 
16 Id. at 505.  
 
17 Id. at 508.   
 
18 Id.  
 
19 Id. at 509.   
 
20 Id. at 513, quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966).    
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forecast of substantial disruption. However, more and more school districts have 
expanded their anti-bullying policies to address cyberbullying or online 
harassment.21 Given increased attention to cyberbullying, there likely will be 
increased focus on the invasion of the rights of others part of Tinker.22  
Much of Fortas’ opinion reads like an ode to the importance of protecting student 
speech. Consider the following passages:  
But, in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of 
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of 
expression. Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause 
trouble.23  
Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, 
that deviates from the views of another person may start an 
argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we 
must take this risk; and our history says that it is this sort of 
hazardous freedom - this kind of openness - that is the basis of our 
national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans 
who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often 
disputatious, society.24 
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of 
totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority 
over their students. Students in school as well as out of school are 
"persons" under our Constitution.25  
In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit 
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate. 
They may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments 
that are officially approved. 
Fortas reasoned that school officials had no reason to believe that the armbands 
would cause a significant disruption or invade the rights of other students.26 
                                                          
21 JAMES C. HANKS. SCHOOL BULLYING: HOW LONG IS THE ARM OF THE LAW? 67 – 104 (2nd ed. 
2015). 
 
22 David L. Hudson, Jr., Federal Judge: School Officials Justified in Suspending Student for 
Cyberbullying, NEWSEUM INSTI., (Oct. 26, 2016), 
http://www.newseuminstitute.org/2016/10/26/federal-judge-school-officials-justified-in-
suspending-student-for-cyberbullying/. 
 
23 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.  
 
24 Id. at 508-09.   
 
25 Id. at 511.  
 
26 Id. at 509.   
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Instead, school officials acted upon “an urgent wish to avoid the controversy 
which might result from the expression.”27 He emphasized that school officials 
suppressed the single symbol, the black armband, but allowed students to wear 
other symbols, like political campaign buttons and even iron crosses.28 
Fortas concluded that “the record does not demonstrate any facts which might 
reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or 
material interference with school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on 
the school premises in fact occurred.”29 
Several lessons emerge from the Tinker case. First, students possess the 
fundamental right of free speech and that school officials’ power to restrict that 
speech is limited. Second, school officials must point to specific evidence 
showing that their fears of disruption are genuine, not based on “undifferentiated 
fear or apprehension of disturbance” or merely a desire to avoid controversy. 
Third it is not just any disruption, such a disruption must be material or 
substantial. Perhaps most importantly, the Court’s entire emphasis was on 
creating a speech-protective test for students.   
The Tinker decision generated a flurry of litigation in public secondary schools. 
The 1970s witnessed students challenging dress codes, hairstyles, censorship of 
student papers, and a variety of other school regulations and policies. However, 
the Supreme Court in the 1980s created two exceptions to Tinker. The Court ruled 
in Bethel School District v. Fraser (1986) that school officials could prohibit 
student speech that was vulgar, lewd, or plainly offensive.30 Two years later, the 
Court adopted another deferential test for so-called school-sponsored student 
speech in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier (1988).31 Nearly two decades 
later, the Court added a third Tinker carve-out for student speech that school 
officials reasonably believes promotes the illegal use of drugs in Morse v. 
Frederick, colloquially known as the “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” decision.32 
These exceptions, or “Supreme Retractions, to Tinker have reduced significantly 
the level of free-speech protections for students.33 Sadly, recent lower court 
decisions have further eroded and corroded the once speech-protective test of 
                                                          
27 Id. at 510.  
 
28 Id. at 511.   
 
29 Id. at 513.   
 
30 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).  
 
31 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988).   
 
32 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 394 (2007).   
 
33 See DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., LET THE STUDENTS SPEAK!: A HISTORY OF THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM 
OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS, 85-104 (2011). 
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Tinker. These decisions threaten the spirit of the Tinker decision. The substantial 
disruption test of Tinker has turned from a student protective standard to one that 
is often quite deferential to government officials. Two prominent examples are 
Bell v. Itawamba School District34 and Dariano v Morgan Hill Unified School 
District.35  
       II. Punishing the Rapping Whistleblower   
John and Mary Beth Tinker are lauded (justifiably) as free-speech icons. 
Eighteen-year-old, high school senior Taylor Bell was not accorded the same 
respect. Bell, through his persona T-Bizzle, posted a rap recording on Facebook 
and then YouTube criticizing two high school football coaches.36 His song 
criticized the two Caucasian coaches for allegedly sexually inappropriate 
comments toward African-American female students. The song featured profanity 
and language that some considered possibly threatening, such as the line “betta 
watch your back/I’m a serve this nigga, like I serve the junkies with some 
crack.”37 
One of the coach’s wives heard the song and contacted her husband, who reported 
it to an assistant principal. School officials sent Bell home that day.38 Later, the 
school superintendent suspended Bell for “alleged threatening intimidation and/or 
harassment of one or more school teachers.”39 After a hearing, a disciplinary 
committee recommended to the school board that Bell face a seven-day 
suspension and be placed in an alternative school for the remainder of the grading 
period.40 The school board not only determined that Bell intimidated and harassed 
the coaches but that his vulgar rap recording also threatened them. The board 
upheld the punishment.41  
Bell sued in federal court, contending school officials violated his First 
Amendment free-speech rights. A federal district court ruled in favor of the 
school defendants, finding that Bell’s rap song constituted “harassment and 
                                                          
34 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015).  
 
35 Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2014).  
  
36 Bell, 799 F.3d at 383.  
  
37 Id. at 384.   
 
38 Id. at 385.  
 
39 Id.   
 
40 Id. at 386.   
 
41 Id. at 387.   
 
           LOSING THE SPIRIT OF TINKER V. DES MOINES           7 
 
intimidation of teachers and possible threats against teachers, and threatened, 
harassed, and intimidated school employees.”42  
Bell appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. A divided three-
judge panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed and ruled in favor of Bell.43 The panel 
majority determined that school official’s violated Bell’s First Amendment rights. 
The majority reasoned that the rap song was not a true threat or substantially 
disruptive under Tinker.44 
However, the school board successfully sought en banc review and prevailed. The 
en banc majority applied the Tinker test, determining that school officials 
“reasonably could find Bell’s rap recording threatened, harassed, and intimidated 
the teachers; and a substantial disruption reasonably could have been forecast, as 
a matter of law.”45  
The en banc majority emphasized the “recent rise in incidents of violence against 
school communities”46 and “increasing concerns regarding school violence.”47 
The majority noted that some students signal potential violence through 
expression.48 The majority reasoned that Tinker applied to Bell’s off-campus 
recording, because Bell intentionally directed his speech toward the school 
community.49   
Four justices wrote separate dissenting opinions. Judge James L. Dennis, who had 
authored the majority opinion at the three-judge panel level, wrote the most 
comprehensive dissent. He termed Bell a “student whistleblower”50, adding that 
four female students had filed affidavits detailing incidents of sexual harassment 
against the coaches that Bell mentioned in his song.51 Dennis emphasized that 
Bell created the speech off-campus and contrasted that with the on-campus 
                                                          
42 Id. at 388, quoting Bell v. Itawamba Sch. Bd., 859 F.Supp.2d 834, 840 (N.D. Miss. 2014).   
 
43 Id. at 388-89, citing Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2014).  
  
44 See David L. Hudson, Jr., Federal Appeals Court Rules in Favor of Student Rapper, NEWSEUM 
INST., (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.newseuminstitute.org/2015/01/27/federal-appeals-court-rules-
in-favor-of-student-rapper/. 
 
45 Bell, 799 F.3d at 391, 397.   
 
46 Id. at 393.   
 
47 Id. 
 
48 Id. at 399.  
 
49 Id. at 396.   
 
50 Id. at 403 (J. Dennis, dissenting).   
 
51 Id. at 409, n.3.   
 
8              CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW ET CETERA 
expressive activities of the students in Tinker. He warned that the majority 
opinion “allows schools to police their students’ Internet expression anytime and 
anywhere-an unprecedented and unnecessary intrusion on students’ rights.”52 He 
further accused the majority of “creating precedent that contravenes the very 
values that the First Amendment seeks to protect.”53 For example, the First 
Amendment was designed to allow people to criticize school officials, but in this 
case school officials silenced Bell’s critical speech.54 
Judge Dennis also noted that the Tinker “reasonable forecast” of disruption 
standard “could be viewed as somewhat vague” and allowed students speech to be 
silenced based on the reactions of others.55 He warned that the majority opinion 
allowed school officials to punish Bell because his song offended and angered 
them.56 
Judge Edward Prado’s dissent emphasized the lack of uniformity in student online 
speech cases. He believed that the majority had stretched precedent to apply it to 
“purely off-campus speech.”57 He warned that Tinker applied to student speech 
that takes place on campus and should be not reflexively applied to off-campus 
speech.58 He wrote that the “difficult issue of off-campus online speech will need 
to be addressed by the Supreme Court.”59 
The Bell case shows that many judges fail to appreciate the speech-protective 
approach that Justice Fortas and the Supreme Court had set forth in Tinker. The 
Vietnam War was one of the most controversial public issues in modern 
American history. The Supreme Court allowed dissenting speech regarding this 
most divisive of public issues to receive First Amendment protection. However, 
the Fifth Circuit in the Bell case readily allowed the punishment of a student who 
blew the whistle on coaches’ alleged sexual harassment.    
The Bell decision sanctions the ability of school officials to silence those who 
blow the whistle and make officials look bad.60 A group of rappers and rap music 
                                                          
52 Id. at 405 (J. Dennis, dissenting).  
 
53 Id. at 411 (J. Dennis, dissenting).   
 
54 Id. at 412 (J. Dennis, dissenting).   
 
55 Id. at 419 (J. Dennis, dissenting).   
 
56 Id. at 432 (J. Dennis, dissenting).   
 
57 Id. at 433 (J. Prado, dissenting).   
 
58 Id. at 434 (J. Prado, dissenting).   
 
59 Id. at 435 (J. Prado, dissenting).  
 
60 Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae of the Student Press Law Center and the 
Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, Inc., In Support of Petitioner at 10, Bell v. 
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scholars explained that the 5th Circuit majority decision discriminated against rap 
music, a genre of music with traditions of political and social protest.61 
Furthermore, the 5th Circuit allowed school officials to punish a student for 
expression he created entirely off-campus. The extension of school officials’ 
power in the Taylor Bell case is astonishing.62   
Bell appealed to the Supreme Court.63 Many speech advocates hoped that the 
Court would grant review to clarify the extent of school official’s authority over 
off-campus, online speech, an issue that has been unresolved for many years.64 
Alas, the Court denied review.   
      III. You Can’t Wear the American Flag  
If punishing a student for rapping about school employees’ misconduct off-
campus was not enough, consider the egregious censorship at Live Oak High 
School in Northern California. Five Caucasian students wore t-shirts depicting the 
American flag to their school on Cinco de Mayo, the Mexican holiday. Some 
students objected to the wearing of American flag t-shirts and questioned the 
students.65 Another student told an assistant principal: “There be some – there 
might be some issues.”66 A group of Mexican students asked the assistant 
principal why the Caucasian students “get to wear their flag out when we don’t 
get to wear our flag?”67 
                                                                                                                                                              
Itawamba School District (15-666) (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/No.-15-666-OK-TO-PRINT-Student-Press-Law-Center-Copy.pdf. 
 
61 Amicus Curiae Brief of Erik Nielson et al. In Support of Petitioner at 12, Bell v. Itawamba Sch. 
Dist. (15-666) (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Brief-of-
Erik-Nielson-et-al-Rap-Scholars-and-Artists.pdf. 
  
62 Note, Katherine D. Landfried, Bell v. Itawamba School District: The Need for a Balance of 
Freedom and Authority, 36 ST. LOUIS PUB. L. REV. 193, 218 (2017); David L. Hudson, Jr.  Case of 
Student Rapper Deserves Close Examination, NEWSEUM INST., (Sept. 29, 2015), 
http://www.newseuminstitute.org/2015/09/29/case-of-student-rapper-deserves-close-examination/. 
 
63 David L. Hudson, Jr., Student-Rapper Appeals to High Court, As a Matter of Last Resort, 
NEWSEUM INST., (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.newseuminstitute.org/2015/12/08/student-rapper-
appeals-to-high-court-as-a-matter-of-last-resort/. 
 
64 Aleheah Jones, Schools, Speech, and Smartphones: Online Speech and the Evolution of the 
Tinker Standard, 15 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 155 (2017); Clay Calvert, Punishing Public School 
Students for Bashing Principals, Teachers & Classmates in Cyberspace: The Speech Issue the 
Supreme Court Must Now Resolve, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 210 (2009) David L. Hudson, Jr. 
Time for the Supreme Court to Address Off-Campus, Online Speech, 91 OR. L. REV. 621 (2012) 
 
65 Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2014).   
 
66 Id.   
 
67 Id. at 775.   
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The assistant principal met with the students and told them to remove the 
American flag t-shirts or turn them inside out. Later, one of the t-shirt wearers 
received a threatening text and phone call.68 The assistant principal decided to 
censor the students’ political expression in part because there was some racial 
tension during the previous year’s Cinco de Mayo at the school.   
The students later filed a federal lawsuit, contending that their free-speech rights 
were violated because they were not allowed to wear the t-shirts.  A federal 
district court ruled against them. On appeal, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed based on its expansive application of the 
Tinker standard. The panel reasoned that “there was evidence of nascent and 
escalating violence at Live Oak.”69   The panel cited both “ongoing racial tension” 
and “gang violence within the school.”70 
The panel recognized that it was limiting speech based on the reactions of other 
students and even referenced that this could “give rise to concerns about a 
heckler’s veto.”71  However, the panel reasoned that in the school environment 
“the crucial distinction is the nature of the speech, not the source of it.”72 The 
panel then analogized the wearing of American flag t-shirt cases to Confederate 
flag t-shirt cases.73 The panel concluded that the school officials acted 
constitutionally under the Tinker standard by reasonably forecasting substantial 
disruption or violence.74 
The students petitioned for en banc review, which was denied. However, Judge 
Diarmund O’Scannlain dissented from the denial of en banc review with a 
bristling dissent.75   He warned that the panel had “condon[ed] the suppression of 
free speech by some students because other students might have reacted 
violently.”76 He described the “heckler’s veto doctrine” as an important and 
venerated principle of First Amendment law.77 He wrote in blunt language: “By 
                                                          
68 Id.  
 
69 Id. at 776.   
 
70 Id. at 777.  
 
71 Id. at 777-78.  
 
72 Id. at 778.   
 
73 Id. at 778-79.   
 
74 Id. at 779.   
 
75 Dariano 767 F.3d 764 (J. O’Scannlain, dissenting).  
 
76 Id. at 766 (J. O’Scannlain, dissenting).  
 
77 Dariano, 767 F.3d at 770-71 (J. O’Scannlain, dissenting); Katherine M. Portner, Tinker’s 
Timeless Teaching: Why the Heckler’s Veto Should Not Be Allowed in Public Schools, 86 MISS. 
L.J. 409, 414 (2017) (“However, it is important to differentiate the "heckler's veto doctrine" from 
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interpreting Tinker to permit the use of the heckler’s veto, the panel opens the 
door to the suppression of any viewpoint opposed by a vocal and violent band of 
students.”78 
The Dariano case represents a repudiation of the spirit of the Tinker ruling. 
Perhaps this is why Mary Beth Tinker and John Tinker filed an amicus curiae 
brief asking the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case.79 As one law student 
commentator aptly noted, “Peaceful student speech that comments on social or 
political issues in a manner that does not bully classmates should not be subject to 
blanket restrictions, even if such speech prompts an angry, disruptive reaction.”80 
Like Taylor Bell, the Dariano plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.81 
They argued in their certiorari petition, that there was “no principled way” to 
distinguish the wearing of an American flag t-shirt from the wearing of black 
armbands to protest the Vietnam War in Tinker.82 The U.S. Supreme Court denied 
review. 
     Conclusion  
Many years ago, Justice Fortas in Tinker proclaimed that “schools are not 
enclaves of totalitarianism” and school officials needed to respect the rights of 
students.83 Nearly fifty years later, many school officials do not respect the rights 
of students. School officials even punish students for purely off-campus 
expression that was not truly threatening and for wearing a t-shirt of the American 
flag.    
Students cannot appreciate the importance of individual liberties if they live in an 
environment that constantly disrespects such liberty and values conformity over 
                                                                                                                                                              
the "heckler's veto" itself. Diametrically opposing the Supreme Court's "heckler's veto doctrine" is 
the heckler's veto, which refers to the actual act of listeners censoring speech simply because they 
disagree.”).   
 
78 Dariano, 767 F.3d at 771 (J. O’Scannlain, dissenting).   
 
79 Frank LoMonte, Protect Students’ right to display the American flag despite ‘hecklers,’ free-
speech icons urge Supreme Court, STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER, (Jan, 26, 2015), 
http://www.splc.org/blog/splc/2015/01/dariano-tinkers-supreme-court-amicus-brief. 
 
80 Note, Julien M. Armstrong. Discarding Dariano: The Hecker’s Veto and a New School Speech 
Doctrine, 26 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 389, 416 (2016).   
 
81 See David L. Hudson, Jr., American Flag T-Shirt Case Appealed to U.S. Supreme Court, 
NEWSEUM INST., (Dec. 26, 2014), http://www.newseuminstitute.org/2014/12/26/american-flag-t-
shirt-case-appealed-to-u-s-supreme-court/. 
 
82 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified School District (14-720), 
http://www.americanfreedomlawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Dariano-Petition-for-
Cert-Final.pdf.  
  
83 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.  
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all else.84 In 1943, Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson warned that school 
officials should respect student rights lest they “strangle the free mind at its 
source and teach youth to discount important principles of government as mere 
platitudes.”85 The landmark case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District displayed an attitude of gratitude for students and their rights. 
Today, that appreciation has been lost. We must regain it. 
                                                          
84 Hudson, Let the Students Speak, at 35. 
 
85 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.   
